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In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under
Title VII: A Reply to Dr. Cohn
ELAINE W. SHOBEN*
The preceding article by Dr. Richard M. Cohn' concerning the
use of statistics in Title VIP employment discrimination cases
makes three basic points. First, Cohn rejects the methods used to
assess disproportionate differences between groups on tests, such
as ability tests. He finds fault both with the approach of the Uni-
form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures3 and with the
method based on finding statistical significance that I have advo-
cated.4 Second, he also rejects the approach courts have adopted
for evaluating the relative exclusion of groups defined by race, sex,
or national origin in the employer's work force. He argues that this
method of comparing the composition of the employer's work force
to the relevant labor pool is an inaccurate probe of whether dis-
crimination has occurred. Finally, Cohn offers an alternative
method for analyzing employment records which he believes
should more accurately detect discrimination.
In each of these sections Cohn's analysis reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the legal questions involved. First, his objec-
tion to my use of statistical inference in testing situations is
grounded in his confusion as to the population about which the
court seeks information. The court needs evidence on all individu-
als who could take the test, such as an aptitude test, both now and
in the future. Information concerning those individuals who took
the test at one particular administration does not probe that legal
question concerning future possible test-takers. Similarly, Cohn's
objection to the population comparison approach used in Title VII
cases is based on his misunderstanding of the definition of discrim-
* A.B. 1970, Barnard College; J.D. 1974, University of California, Hastings College of
Law. Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
' Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55 IND. L.J. 493
(1980).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -17 (1976). Cohn's article does not specifically identify
what employment discrimination law he is addressing, but his references suggest that he is
concerned with Title VIL As to the relevance of Cohn's methods to constitutional employ-
ment discrimination claims, see note 71 infra.
3 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under
Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978).
1 See notes 10-34 & accompanying text infra.
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ination as articulated by the Supreme Court.6 Discrimination may
be found under Title VII if selection procedures have the effect of
disproportionately excluding a group covered by the Act, regard-
less of the employer's good faith, unless the employer can meet the
burden of showing the job-relatedness of the procedures. Cohn's
criticisms and his alternative model both reflect his apparent as-
sumption that it is only intentional discrimination or unequal
treatment of similarly situated individuals that are prohibited
types of discrimination. His suggested focus on the differences in
rate of hire by race or sex of those individuals who actually pass
the selection procedures is especially indicative of his assumption.
He would ask, for example, what are the selection rates of individ-
uals who have already satisfied an educational requirement? The
Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,7 has endorsed a
much broader definition of discrimination under Title VII; it is the
impact of the selection procedures themselves, such as an educa-
tion requirement, on the actual and potential applicants that is at
issue. If there is an adverse impact, and if the employer cannot
validate the requirement, it is a violation of the Act.8 Quantitative
evidence must be used responsively to the legal issues. To use
quantitative evidence otherwise is to allow the method of proof to
reshape the issues.
This reply contends that Cohn's arguments are based on a mis-
understanding of the legally relevant questions under Title VII
and thus that he proposes the use of particular quantitative meth-
ods that provide answers to the wrong questions.9 The exceptions
that this reply takes with each of the three sections of Cohn's arti-
cle are not concerning any disagreement over statistics. To the
contrary, we are in perfect agreement as to the underlying assump-
tions that must be met with situations using statistical inference.
Rather, our disagreements revolve around questions of law and
logic.
DIFFERENCES IN TEST PASS RATES: DEFINING THE
'POPULATION"
Cohn addresses in the first part of his article the use of statisti-
6 See notes 53-58 & accompanying text infra.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
See notes 64-71 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 55:515
HeinOnline -- 55 Ind. L.J. 516 1979-1980
USE OF STATISTICS: A REPLY
cal inference in evdluating differences in pass rates between two
groups, such as blacks and whites, on employee selection proce-
dures. He asserts that it is inappropriate to use statistical inference
in such situations because the data being analyzed represent the
entire population (statistical population) in question, not just a
sample of the population.10 If this assertion were correct, then we
would be in agreement that an analysis based on statistical infer-
ence, such as the use of the test for the difference between inde-
pendent proportions that was advocated in my article on the sub-
ject, would be inappropriate.1  Our disagreement therefore
concerns only the question of how to define "population" in em-
ployee testing situations. Cohn's limited definition is both unre-
sponsive to the relevant legal question and unrealistically narrow
scientifically as well. The population must be defined to include
future applicants as well as present ones.
In statistics a population is the set of people or items in which
one is specifically interested. 2 The population could be all Ameri-
cans in a particular age group, all residents of a state, all persons
with a particular physical characteristic, or the like. A sample is
simply a subset of that larger set; a random sample is a sample
selected from the population in which every member of the popu-
lation has an equal chance of being included in the sample and
selections for the sample are independent. 3 Statistical inference
requires the assumption that the sample being studied is represen-
tative of the population, and one procedure for meeting this as-
sumption is random sampling.'4
In some employment discrimination situations the data being
examined are population data, not sample data. For example, if
the court wants to know whether more white males than black
males have completed high school in one state, the census table
gives an exact count of all the people in the specified population,
namely white and black males in that state.15 If the court wants to
10 Cohn, supra note 1, at text preceeding n.9.
11 See Shoben, supra note 4, at 798.
1 See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 5-7, 109-10 (2d ed. 1972); A. EDWARDS, STATISTICAL
METHODS 15 (3d ed. 1973); L. HOROWITZ, ELEMENTS OF STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY AND EDU-
CATION 156-57 (1974); G. SNEDECOR & W. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 4, 29-30 (6th ed.
1967); A. STUART, BASIC IDEAS OF SCIENTIFIC SAMPLING 10 (3d ed. 1968).
1" See, e.g., L. HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 158; G. SNEDECOR & W. COCHRAN, supra note
12, at 10, 29.
11 See, e.g., L. HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 159-60; A. STUART, supra note 12, at 11.
16 This was the approach appropriately used by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
1980]
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know whether more men than women over the age of eighteen in
the United States are taller than five feet two inches, a precise
count is available. 6 Statistical inference is inappropriate in such
circumstances because the question asked has already been fully
answered by the data.17 Similarly, if the court wants to know the
effect of a discontinued employee selection procedure, such as a
one time exam for promotion, then the population in question
would be all those who had taken the exam and data on the entire
population are available.
Cohn maintains that any employee selection test, including ones
with on-going administration, defines a separate population every
time or small group of times the test is given." He thus argues that
it is inappropriate to use statistical inference to infer the charac-
teristics of a larger group because the data being examined re-
present the results for the entire population. This conclusion does
not comport either with the relevant legal question or with logic,
however. If the court wants to know whether more whites than
blacks pass a test among those who have taken or could take the
test, then the population cannot be defined as only those who have
taken the test in one narrow time frame. The population must be
defined as those who have taken or could take the test, because
that is the set of people in which the court is interested. In class
actions, the class is typically defined as "all present and future ap-
plicants" to the defendant employer, thus defining the population
to be considered by the evidence.
19
Once the population is defined as all those who have taken or
could take the test, the next question is whether the particular
group of people who happened to take the test at one particular
time are a representative sample of the population. There may be
"6 This was the approach appropriately used by the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977). See also Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 52 n.1
(8th Cir. 1977); Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 710 (D. Md.
1979); United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D. Va. 1978).
,7 See discussion in Shoben, supra note 4, at 797-98. For examples and further discussion,
see Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with
Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1977).
'8 Cohn, supra note 1, at n.10 & accompanying text.
'9 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 861 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Louisville
Black Police Officers v. City, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1195, 1197 (W.D. Ky. 1979);
Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See also Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines,
Inc., 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977) (only future applicants certified as class, not including past
applicants).
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factors that affect the randomness of the sample because the mem-
bers of the sample are self-selected; among all the people who
could apply for a job with the defendant employer at one particu-
lar time, this group self-selected themselves to apply. The recruit-
ment policies of the defendant can also severely affect the repre-
sentativeness of the sample of applicants from among all those who
could apply.20 These are considerations of randomness, however,
and do not challenge the basic question of what constitutes the
population in question.
Cohn's argument that the population must be limited to those
who take the exam at one time is supported solely by his assertion
that there cannot be any larger group in question because there is
no known probability by which others may become a part of the
sample.21 Although it is true that most members of the population
will never apply, the sampling requirement is only that each mem-
ber of the population have a known probability of being included
in the sample,22 and that probability is assumed to be equal in em-
ployment discrimination cases. In any given year any individual in
the relevant labor pool is presumed equally likely to apply for a job
with the defendant.23 The self-selection process that causes some
individuals to apply that year and not others makes the sample
haphazardly compiled, but a sample nonetheless.24 The group in
which the court is interested is still the larger group of all those
who could apply.
If information about actual applicants is unavailable or is too
20 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-67 (1977).
21 Cohn, supra note 1, text between nn. 8 & 9.
22 See, e.g., L. HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 158; G. SNEDECOR & W. COCHRAN, supra note
12, at 10, 29.
23 This assumption is implicit in the Supreme Court's assertion that "absent explanation,
it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition in the commu-
nity from which employees are hired." Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307 (1977) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
n.20 (1977)). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977).
24 See note 12 supra. See also L. KISH, SURVEY SAMPLING (1965), cited in Cohn, supra
note 1, at n.4. Kish's text, best suited for attitudinal surveys, rejects as inadequate all forms
of sampling except probability sampling based upon a mechanical procedure. Id. at 26. Kish
recognizes, however, that more haphazard forms of sampling, such as use of volunteers, are
indeed samples (not populations as Cohn apparently argues) with poor controls for repre-
sentativeness. Id. at 19. Kish even acknowledges that great advances in the most successful
hard sciences have occurred without mechanical probability sampling, and that the social
and biological sciences routinely rely on haphazard sampling, usually out of necessity. Id. at
28-29.
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unreliable to be considered a representative sample of the popula-
tion, the approach in Title VII cases is to compare the composition
of the employer's work force with the composition of the surround-
ing community. This approach, recently sanctioned by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Hazelwood School District,25 is
based on the same logic that samples are drawn from larger popu-
lations. The underlying assumption in this community composition
comparison approach is that the employer's work force is the prod-
uct of several samples drawn from the population of available
workers with appropriate skills from a relevant geographic area. It
is assumed that over time the composition of an employer's work
force will not deviate greatly from the composition of the sur-
rounding community if it is true that the selection processes do not
have a discriminatory effect on any group.2 Phrased statistically,
the inquiry is whether the sample (the employer's work force) is an
unbiased one taken from the defined population whose characteris-
tics are already known (composition by race, sex, or national ori-
gin). If the composition of the sample deviates from the population
more than would be expected by chance alone, then it is assumed
that the selection of the sample was biased by the selection proce-
dures used by the employer. Legally, then, the burden shifts to
the employer to show the business necessity of those procedures.2
Both of these methods of analysis in Title VII cases-examining
the pass rates of applicants or comparing the composition of the
work force with that of the relevant labor pool-are concerned
with answering the legal question as defined by the Supreme
Court. That question is whether the employer has engaged in prac-
tices that have the effect of disproportionately excluding a group
covered by the Act. The question in such cases is not whether sev-
eral individuals have been wrongfully excluded, but whether the
larger group to which the plaintiffs belong is adversely affected by
25 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
26 Id. at 307.
27 In Hazelwood the Court refers specifically to the use of inferential statistics. Id. at 308-
09 n.14. In doing so, the Court relies upon a jury discrimination case it had recently decided
in which inferential statistics were also employed. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-
97 n.17 (1977). For an explanation of the statistical technique used, see Finkelstein, The
Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 H v. L.
REV. 338 (1966). For a discussion of the appropriate use of this technique for discrimination
cases, see Shoben, Book Review, 59 B.U. L. REv. 582, 585-89 (1979).
28 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
[Vol. 55:515
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the procedures. 9 It is thus appropriate in class actions for courts
to define the represented class as including not only present appli-
cants or employees, but future applicants or employees as well.30 It
is precisely this larger group that is at issue.
Given that the relevant legal question to be addressed concerns a
broadly defined population, both academicians and advocates can
then quarrel over whether particular statistical techniques are
more accurate than others. Also critical is the problem with the
self-selection of individuals into the applicant process, making the
sample biased by self-selection factors.3' The impracticality of a
court requiring a mechanized random selection must be consid-
ered. 2 Cohn specifically says that his comments do not go to these
questions.3 3 His position is that methods of statistical inference are
inappropriate only because the applicants in one time frame alone
constitute the population and that they cannot be considered a
sample of a larger group. 4
Cohn's position is not only unresponsive to the legal question to
be addressed, but it is also not logical that the population must be
so narrowly defined. As an example, consider the following prob-
lem in defining populations. Assume that a drug manufacturer has
discovered a new drug to cure strep throat that was designed to
effect a cure faster than penicillin. Assume that this new drug was
given to a group of strep throat sufferers who volunteered to try it.
A control group of strep throat patients was given penicillin as
usual. The results of the experiment showed that one hundred per-
cent of the people who took the new drug were cured after three
days whereas no one in the control group taking penicillin recov-
ered in that time. Does the new drug effect a cure for strep throat
faster than penicillin?
2 Questions of discrimination against the individual under Title VII are analyzed in ac-
cordance with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972). The Supreme Court
has carefully distinguished between such individual claims of disparate treatment and class-
based claims of disparate impact. In an individual claim of disparate treatment the plaintiff
must prove purposeful discrimination against him. On the other hand, a plaintiff bringing a
disparate impact claim need only prove, for a prima facie case, the proportionate impact of
facially neutral employment policies, and need not prove that the defendant intended to
discriminate. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
O See cases cited note 19 supra.
" See notes 14 & 20 supra.
" See discussion of practicality and non-mechanized sampling in note 24 supra.
Cohn, supra note 1, at n.9.
s, Id. at text preceeding n.9.
1980]
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The problem in this example is how to define the population. 5
The question which the scientific community will want answered is
whether the new drug effects a cure faster for strep throat patients
both now and in the future. The individuals in the experiment are
a sample of this population of strep throat patients, even though
obviously no future patients could have been selected for the sam-
ple. Scientists can then use an appropriate statistical test to deter-
mine whether the favorable result in the experiment was statisti-
cally significant. If so, then the drug is suitably distributed for use
by both present and future strep throat patients, and medical sci-
ence has progressed.
Cohn's analysis, however, suggests that he rejects this kind of
scientific inquiry because it is not possible to include future strep
throat patients in the sample.36 This particular approach, which is
better suited to attitudinal surveys than to science, provokes a dis-
cussion of all the possible ways to define the population in this
example and, by analogy, in testing situations in employment dis-
crimination cases.
In the strep throat drug example there are conceivably three
ways of defining the population in question: (1) the actual people
in the experiment only; (2) all people who had strep throat exactly
at the time of the experiment; and (3) all people who had strep
throat at the time of the experiment and those who may contract
it in the future. This third group could be described as the public
at large because everyone is susceptible to the infection. If the
population is defined as only those who were in the experiment,
then the entire population is represented in the data and the ques-
tion concerning whether the drug effected a cure faster than peni-
cillin can be answered as yes; among those in the narrowly defined
population, the new drug worked faster. This information is useless
with respect to anyone else, however, because the population does
not include anyone who may take the drug in the future. No con-
clusions about the effectiveness of the drug on others could be
made and the drug should not be marketed.
The population could be defined as all those who had strep
throat exactly at the time of the experiment. The people in the
experiment could then be called a sample of the larger population
of people who could have been in the experiment. The fact that
the sample was self-selected (volunteers) poses a question concern-
3' For a statistical definition of "population" see note 12 & accompanying text supra.
"6 Cohn, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.5-13.
[Vol. 55:515
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ing whether this sample is biased, but the people in the experiment
would have to be called a sample nonetheless."7 It is necessary to
use inferential statistics to decide whether the result shown in the
sample was likely to happen by chance alone even if the new drug
is really no more effective than penicillin. If the result of the statis-
tical analysis is significant,8 then it can be concluded that the new
drug works faster on people who currently have strep throat. Lim-
ited marketing to that group would be appropriate, but not to any-
one who contracted strep throat after the time of the experiment.
The question that the experimenter would obviously want to
have answered is whether the drug is effective among all those peo-
ple who currently have or may contract strep throat. The popula-
tion must thus be broadly defined because it is that large group in
which the investigator is interested. Do the results from the experi-
ment reveal anything about the population thus defined? Inferen-
tial statistics can be used to make a conclusion about this popula-
tion if the sample is adequately representative of the population.
Problems of gampling bias now appear in two ways; the self-selec-
tion problem again must be considered, as well as the problem that
those who currently have strep throat may somehow differ from
future strep throat patients. These problems of bias must be con-
sidered and weighed along with problems of policy and practicality
in deciding whether the inference from this sample is justified. If it
is, then an appropriate statistical test should be chosen and analy-
sis conducted to see if the result is significant.
In a Title VII case, the court is faced with the question that the
scientific experimenter has in the example, namely how to draw
inferences about the population as defined as present applicants as
well as potential applicants. 9 Cohn's approach would suggest that
neither the scientist nor the court can draw conclusions about the
broadly defined populations, because future strep throat patients
or future applicants to an employer could not have been in the
sample groups. This approach is really based upon an objection to
3 See notes 21-24 & accompanying text supra.
" The level of "statistical significance" refers essentially to how certain an investigator
wants to be that a difference found in a sample might not have occurred by chance alone
even if there is no difference in the unknown population. Social scientists often adopt a five
percent level of significance, meaning that there is no more than one chance in twenty that
the difference appearing in the sample could have happened by chance alone even if there is
no difference in the population. For a more extensive discussion, see L. HOROWITZ, supra
note 12, at 156-65.
39 Compare the definition of the class typically used in Title VII cases as including future
applicants or employees. See note 19 supra.
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the bias in the sampling process. The court has already defined the
group in which it is interested, so that group must be the popula-
tion. If there is so much bias in the sampling process that no con-
clusions can be drawn about the population, then nothing can be
said in answer to the question asked. Cohn suggests that a totally
different question should be answered instead; namely, was the
test passed at a greater rate by one group in one time frame
only?40 The answer to this question is as irrelevant to the question
asked by the court as focusing only on the strep throat experimen-
tal group would be to the scientist. As to whether there is too
much bias in the sampling process to draw conclusions, social and
medical science can rarely enjoy mechanized random sampling.41
Issues of policy and practicality must be considered in evaluating
the sampling process, or else relevant questions can never be an-
swered in these fields.
QUANTITATIVE PROOF FOR ANSWERING LEGAL QUESTIONS OF
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
In the second portion of Cohn's article, he criticizes the use of
what he calls inappropriate quantitative measures to define dis-
crimination. The thrust of his argument is that the approaches
presently used by the courts are inappropriate because they do not
account for differences in true qualifications among applicant
groups. 42 He suggests instead a comparison of the rates of hiring
members of each group from among those who pass the employer's
selection procedures. 3 In essence, are blacks who pass the selection
procedures hired at the same rate as whites who pass? This reply
contends that Cohn's analysis reflects a fundamental misunder-
standing of the expansive legal definition of discrimination under
Title VII. The concept of discrimination is not limited to the kind
40 Cohn suggests that the Uniform Guidelines, supra note 3, do not seek to answer a
question requiring an inference from a sample to the relevant population. Cohn, supra note
1, at text accompanying nn.7-8. The "4/5ths rule" is clearly intended to be used as a tool of
statistical inference, however, and has been so used by some courts. See, e.g., Brown v. New
Haven Civil Service Board, 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D.C. Conn. 1979); Moore v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 232, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd., 593 F.2d
607 (5th Cir. 1979). Cohn recognizes that the provision in the Uniform Guidelines for use of
tests of statistical significance refers to the use of statistical inference. Cohn, supra note 1,
text accompanying nn.10-12.
41 See note 24 supra.
42 Cohn, supra note 1, at text between nn.23 & 24.
4 Id. at text accompanying n.24.
[Vol. 55:515
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of unequal treatment that Cohn's analysis would probe. The selec-
tion procedures themselves are at issue if they have the effect of
disproportionately excluding a group protected by the Act for
whatever reason. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show
the business necessity of the requirement."
Cohn's concept of "qualification" as an unknowable abstraction
is irrelevant to this inquiry. Title VII analysis begins with the egal-
itarian assumption that abilities are equally distributed among
groups in our society. If a selection procedure, such as an aptitude
test, disproportionately excludes a group, regardless of what social
factors may have influenced the poorer performance by that
group,4 5 it is the defendant's burden to prove the job-relatedness of
the test. To do so the employer must demonstrate that scores on
the test predict actual job performance. The abstract concept of
qualification can have no meaning in Title VII except in reference
to concrete selection procedures unless this allocation of the bur-
den of proof is abandoned.46
Cohn further suggests that evidence of the "fair administration"
of selection procedures should be used to infer that the selection
rate among "qualified" blacks is equal to the selection rate among
"qualified" whites.47 Cohn's use of this inference is based on the
completely unjustified assumption that the particular selection
procedures are validly related to the job. He seems to assume that
the Uniform Guidelines' requirements for validating selection pro-
cedbres allow analysis to start with the assumption that they are
" For a discussion of the various definitions of discrimination under Title VII and the
importance of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in accepting the disparate
impact definition rather than the limited unequal treatment definition, see Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrim-
ination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
45 The Supreme Court addressed this issue squarely in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed that, on the
record in the present case, "whites register far better on the Company's alter-
native requirements" than Negroes. This consequence would appear to be di-
rectly traceable to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation
to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, peti-
tioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools . ...
.. . The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
401 U.S. at 430-31 (footnote and citation omitted).
4' See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). For further discussion of these
points, see notes 53-63 & accompanying text infra.
47 Cohn, supra note 1, at text preceeding n.23 and at text accompanying n.24.
19801
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valid, whereas that very fact must be litigated. It is the defendant
who must prove to the court that a requirement, such as a testing
requirement, is job-related; an employer cannot simply declare
that the testing requirement is job-related. This crucial step in the
case cannot be omitted in favor of proof merely that the test was
fairly applied to both blacks and whites.48 Unequal treatment in
administration is indeed prohibited discrimination under the Act,49
but proof of equal treatment cannot dispel a prima facie case es-
tablished by showing that the testing requirement disproportion-
ately excludes blacks.5 0
Finally, Cohn's emphasis in this portion of his article on the de-
sirability of using applicant flow data to "detect discrimination"
again reflects his unfamiliarity with the ample consideration courts
have already given this subject. The Supreme Court has discussed
arguments such as the ones advanced by Cohn and the Court has
made it clear that applicant flow data is relevant but not control-
ling.51 This conclusion is based upon problems of logic and practi-
cality not included in Cohn's analysis.2 Each of these objections to
Cohn's analysis is further explained below.
In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis
Cohn's objection to disparate impact analysis begins with his ob-
servation that the proportion of qualified applicants for a job- is
unknown. His idea of "qualified" is not explicitly defined, but the
idea is clarified by his reference to "unequal opportunities for
schooling, job training programs, accumulation of relevant job ex-
perience, and other factors." 53 He proceeds to note that there is no
reason to assume that the proportion of qualified applicants among
majority and minority groups are equal. Differences in educational
opportunity for blacks, for example, may result in fewer qualified
48 The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Griggs noted particularly
the lack of discrimination in the administration and scoring of the tests. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233 (1970). The Supreme Court's reversal did not find error in
the Court of Appeals' examination of intent, but held that such proof does not redeem prac-
tices or tests "that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups" unless they are job-
related. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
" United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 916 (5th Cir. 1973).
60 For further discussion of these issues, see notes 53-58 & accompanying text infra.
8 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977).
2 For further discussion of these issues, see notes 72-81 & accompanying text infra.
"' Cohn, supra note 1, at text following n.18.
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black applicants than white applicants.5
It is precisely the elusiveness of the concept of "qualification"
that caused the Supreme Court to reject this kind of analysis. A
Title VII case alleging class discrimination therefore begins with
the assumption that all groups are equally qualified for most
jobs.5 It is left to the defendant to prove otherwise if a selection
procedure shows different rates of exclusion. A high school diploma
requirement or aptitude tests, for example, cannot be used when
they have a disparate impact unless the employer can show that
these requirements are job-related.56 Cohn's order of analysis
would appear to put the burden of showing the lack of job-related-
ness on the plaintiff, which would be an impossible burden. It is
the defendant who has the access to the information that allows
proof of the job-relatedness of selection procedures.
Cohn's concept of qualification might be useful for a scientific
study of differences between groups defined by race, sex, or na-
tional origin, but it is a red herring in the Title VII context. Cohn
argues at one point, for example, that it is important to control for
differences in qualifications such as experience and education be-
tween majority and minority groups "to allow for racial compari-
sons when these qualifications are held constant.157 Again, this ap-
proach seeks the answer to a question not posed. Cohn's approach
seeks to find out if the test measures racial differences unrelated to
nonracial factors such as experience and education. The relevant
legal question, however, is whether the test has the effect of dis-
proportionately excluding one group for whatever reason. If blacks
are excluded by a test because on the whole they have had fewer
educational opportunities than whites, then the test still may not
be used unless the employer shows the job-relatedness of the test.
The fact that education is a nonracial factor, and one beyond the
employer's control, is irrelevant.58 The court is not seeking to an-
Id. See also id. at n.11.
The Supreme Court explained the use of a population comparison in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), as "highly probative, because the
job skill involved-the ability to drive a truck-is one that many persons possess or can
fairly readily acquire." Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13
(1977). The only exception to this assumption that abilities are equally divided among racial
groups is when a special skill, such as having a state license to teach school, is a legitimate
requirement. See further discussion at notes 59-63 & accompanying text infra.
" These were the requirements involved in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
57 Cohn, supra note 1, at n.11; see also id., text at n.28.
BR See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971), quoted in note 45 supra.
See also United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
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swer any scientific questions about race and ability; if it were, then
controlling for nonracial differences would be important. Title VII
simply prohibits the use of unvalidated requirements that have the
effect of reducing employment opportunities for any group pro-
tected by the Act.
The one respect in which the concept of "qualification" is not a
red herring in Title VII cases concerns situations where a particu-
lar job requires clearly recognized special skills not possessed or
easily acquired by the general population.5 9 The primary example
of this type of job is a school teacher. A school district justifiably
limits its applicants for teachers to those members of the public
who have teaching certificates. Similarly,'a law firm can limit ap-
plicants for lawyer positions to those who have been admitted to
the Bar.60 How far the idea of "special skills" extends beyond pro-
fessional state licensing requirements, however, is questionable.
This limited concept certainly does not extend to an employer's
general ideas of desirable qualifications, such as diploma require-
ments,6 ' height requirements,62 or aptitude tests,63 unless the job
relatedness of these requirements has been shown. The special
skills cases can be seen as those limited instances when the job-
relatedness of certain requirements may be assumed without other
proof by the defendant.
Rejection of Cohn's Reliance on Unequal Treatment Measures
The unfairness that Cohn sees against Employer 1 in his exam-
U.S. 875 (1977):
Defendants contend that this evidence [of the racial impact of a written exam]
is insufficient to show discrimination because plaintiffs failed to show that the
disproportionate failure rate resulted from racial factors. This argument mis-
conceives the legal standard to be utilized in determining whether a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination exists within the meaning of Title VI. Plaintiffs did
not need to show that the examination was devised with the intent to exclude
racial minorities or that a direct causal relationship exists between an appli-
cant's race and his performance. Rather, plaintiffs needed only to show that
the examination had an adverse impact on minority applicants as a group; at
that point, the burden would be on the city to demonstrate that the examina-
tion in fact tested job-related qualifications.
Id. at 428 (citations omitted).
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
0 See, e.g., Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (lawyers); Cypress
v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) (doctors).
81 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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ple shown in his Table I is premised on the initial assumption that
among applicants, ninety percent of the whites, but only sixty per-
cent of the blacks are qualified. 4 If Cohn is referring only to spe-
cial skills situations, his argument has merit. He appears to be ar-
guing the general case, however. He maintains that the defendant
should be able to support his case by pointing to "qualitative evi-
dence of fair administration of the selection procedures"6 5 to infer
that the selection rate among qualified blacks equals the selection
rate among qualified whites.
To the extent that this approach reflects only a suggestion for
relevant rebuttal evidence by the defendant, it is useful;66 to the
extent that it purports to help "define discrimination" as the title
of his section suggests, it is inappropriate. As Cohn noted previ-
ously, his concept of qualification among applicants is unknow-
able. It is for that reason that he must suggest only evidence of
the "fair administration" of selection procedures to make the infer-
ence of nondiscrimination. In reality, or at least in litigation, quali-
fication is provable only by the selection procedures. Therefore,
courts have properly focused on the selection procedures, not the
abstraction of qualification. To focus on qualification by proof of
the fair administration of the selection procedures is to dilute the
concept of discrimination under Title VII to the point where only
equal treatment is required.6 8 When an aptitude test is used to se-
"4 Cohn, supra note 1, at nn.22-23 & accompanying text (Table I). Conversely, the unfair-
ness which Cohn sees against Employer 2 in the same table is all premised on the assump-
tion that a greater proportion of black applicants are qualified than whites. Both examples
thus rely on the persuasiveness of his abstract concept of "true qualification" independent
of any measures of qualification.
65 Id. at text preceeding n.23.
66 The defendant may introduce a great variety of rebuttal evidence in a disparate impact
case because the Supreme Court has noted appropriately that "statistics are not irrefutable;
they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In
short, their usefulness depends on all the surrounding facts and circumstances." Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 341 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). The rebuttal evidence
must be probative of the question of whether there was any disparate impact caused by the
employer's selection procedures. Such evidence may include post-Act hiring data or appli-
cant flow data. Id.; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977). Evidence that merely
goes to good faith or lack of unequal treatment, such as Cohn's suggested use of evidence of
the fair administration of the procedures, does not rebut a prima facie case based on the
disparate impact of the procedures. The defendant must show also the business necessity of
the criteria. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Compare the unsuccessful
attempt of a defendant to advance a claim that there was a disproportionately large number
of less qualified minorities in the applicant pool. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d
1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1967).
' Cohn, supra note 1, at n.18 & accompanying text.
18 On the difference between impact analysis and unequal treatment, see -International
1980]
HeinOnline -- 55 Ind. L.J. 529 1979-1980
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
lect employees, the focus would be simply on whether the test was
administered fairly. Under this scheme, courts would never probe
whether a selection procedure is irrelevant to the job, so long as it
is fairly administered. Surely Cohn did not mean to allow this con-
clusion, but otherwise his focus on the unknowable proportion of/
qualified applicants is without relevance except in the limited area
of special skills cases already discussed. 9
Similarly, Cohn's suggested use of the comparative ratio of those
hired among those of each group who pass the selection proce-
dures70 is very limited in its usefulness. Suppose that one hundred
percent of whites who pass the selection procedures are offered
employment whereas only ten percent of the blacks passing are of-
fered employment. This information would clearly be relevant in
an employment discrimination case, especially to show intentional
discrimination. 71 If, however, the rates of offers to each group are
identical among those who pass the selection procedures, this in-
formation reflects only on the good faith of the defendant; among
the blacks who pass the aptitude test one hundred percent are
hired and among the whites who pass one hundred percent are
hired. This approach does not reveal anything about the possible
impact of the selection- procedures themselves; it concerns only the
equal treatment of similarly situated individuals. Questions of dis-
parate impact remain unanswered by this approach.
Applicant Flow
Cohn's attack on the community composition comparison ap-
proach to disparate impact includes his observation that minority
and majority group members may not become applicants to the
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12 (1976).
" See notes 59-63 & accompanying text supra.
70 Cohn, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.20.
7' Evidence of intentional discrimination is not necessary in a Griggs-based claim of dis-
parate impact under Title VII, but it is necessary in cases where the government has
pleaded intentional discrimination as part of a pattern or practice suit. International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 341 U.S. 324, 328-29 n.1, 336-37 n.16. Evidence of intentional
discrimination is essential in cases brought under the Constitution. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cohn's suggested use of comparative rates of hire from among those
who pass the employer's selection procedures would be useful to probe intentional discrimi-
nation, especially in cases brought under these jurisdictional bases. It is uncertain, however,
whether statistics alone can ever suffice to establish a case of intentional discrimination
without additional testimony of specific instances of individual discrimination. Compare the
language in Teamsters, 341 U.S. at 338-39, and Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42.
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employer at the same rate. He therefore finds it misleading to rely
on a population or labor pool comparison without indication of the
proportion of applicants from each group. 2 Cohn relies on a 1970
district court case to support this proposition legally.73 Both legally
and logically, however, requiring an impact in the applicant flow
data to establish a plaintiff's prima facie case is incorrect. Cohn's
observation has clear merit, but not to the extent of rejecting the
community composition comparison approach.
On the legal side, the Supreme Court made it clear in Dothard v.
Rawlinson,74 in 1977, that a plaintiff is not required to show dis-
proportionate applicant flow figures to establish a prima facie case.
The logic of the Court was that known requirements, such as a
height requirement, affect applications;75 an employer's reputation
similarly affects applications. 6 Although applicant flow evidence is
relevant, it is the defendant who must introduce it to rebut the
prima facie case. 7 If the court finds that potential applicants are
not adequately reflected among actual applicants, such rebuttal ev-
idence should be insufficient to dispel the prima facie case. In-
stead, the court continues to assume that minority and majority
groups would want to apply for the job in the same ratio as they,
are represented in the relevant labor pool.7 8 The practical effect of
holding otherwise would be to encourage employers not to keep ap-
plicant flow data,7 9 to minimize contacts with the minority commu-
nity,8 ° and to let unvalidated requirements such as a height re-
1 Cohn, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.15.
73 Id. at n.15.
7' 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
71 Id. at 330.
76 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 341 U.S. 324, 365-67 (1977).
7 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977).
71 Id. In dissent, Justice White took the position that the burden should be on the plain-
tiff to show that the composition of the applicant pool was distorted by the exclusion of
potential applicants who did not apply because of the allegedly discriminatory requirement.
Id., at 348-49 (White, J., dissenting).
71 It is noteworthy that one of the key Supreme Court cases establishing the relevant
population comparison approach involved an employer who did not keep reliable records of
applications. Hazelwood School Ditt. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301-03 (1977).
so Compare the recruitment procedures used in League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 881, modified on other grounds, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1976). On recruitment practices generally see B. SCHLEI & P.
GRossMAN, supra note 68, at 445-54. Cohn acknowledges that an employer's recruitment
practices may influence applications, but focuses on other factors such as alternative job
opportunities to conclude that failure to consider applicant ratios is misleading. Cohn, supra
note 1, at text preceeding n.15. It is unclear how his point relates to the problem of the
allocation of proof in trial. The overall thrust of his argument is that disaggregated mea-
sures of the selection process should be used, so presumably he intends that the plaintiff
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quirement be generally known. 1
COHN'S PROPOSED ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE
In the final section of his article, Cohn proposes a model which
he says concerns how information is properly analyzed to detect
discrimination.s2 This portion of his article suffers from the same
problems identified in the previous sections. This model is limited
in its usefulness because it appears to rely on a concept of inten-
tional discrimination in its approach to "detecting" discrimination.
Its usefulness in probing questions concerning the bona fide occu-
pational qualification (BFOQ) defense is also limited because of
Cohn's apparent misunderstanding of the current legal use of that
concept.
Cohn uses correlation analysis to ascertain whether sex or age
can be a BFOQ.8s He uses an example of an employer with three
equally weighted requirements: an educational requirement, a
weightlifting test, and a requirement that the applicant be willing
to stay on the job for at least five years. He shows that the only
one of these requirements that affects the probability of a woman
being hired more than a man being hired in his hypothetical data
is the weightlifting requirement. His analysis then proceeds that
"[s]ince the probability of hiring is based on the expected produc-
tivity in the job, this sex difference in the hiring probability repre-
sents an expected sex difference in productivity."84
This proposition makes the assumption that the weightlifting re-
quirement is valid. If it is not, then Cohn's model is irrelevant.
Cohn acknowledges this problem at the conclusion of his discus-
sion, but adds sanguinely that the Uniform Guidelines' require-
ments for job validation should make objective job analyses more
common.8 5 This anticipation will hopefully be fulfilled, but the re-
sult would still not solve the problem. Job-relatedness must be es-
would have the burden of producing the applicant ratios. The Supreme Court's approach of
allowing the defendant to rebut with applicant flow only if the court can be persuaded of
the reliability of the figures appears to be the better solution.
81 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977); Smith v. City of East Cleve-
land, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd. in part and rev'd. in part sub nom.
Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
82 Cohn, supra note 1, at text preceeding n.25.
83 Id. at text accompanying n.29.
84 Id. at text preceeding n.32.
15 Id. at text accompanying n.38.
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tablished factually by the court during the litigation."6 It is the
court that determines the business necessity of requirements; the
employer cannot simply assert it. Therefore, a model that starts
with the assumption that requirements are job-related either must
contemplate a complete reversal of the Griggs order of proof or
must not be intended as a litigation model of analysis.
Cohn's analysis proceeds that the sex difference in weightlifting
used by the hypothetical employer can make sex a BFOQ if the
correlation between sex and weightlifting is high. In his example,
the moderate strength of the correlation with a coefficient of 0.5
would make it "difficult for the employer to substantiate" the
BFOQ claim. 87 The underlying assumption that a higher correla-
tion might substantiate the claim is incorrect. The BFOQ defense
is very narrowly defined. The Supreme Court's formulation of the
test for a BFOQ in a sex discrimination context is whether the em-
ployee's "very womanhood" would "directly undermine her capac-
ity" to do the job.8 A similar formulation is whether the "essence
of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively. '" 8 Another test, perhaps closest to
Cohn's concept, is whether "all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of'the job
involved." 90 The Seventh Circuit clarified all these formulations in
a more recent case by noting that the critical issue was whether
females had a "sexual characteristic" different than males that
would affect their ability to perform the job. 1 The decision further
noted: "Characteristics that might, to one degree or another, corre-
late with a particular sex are insufficient to provide the basis for a
BFOQ. 91 2 Height is highly correlated with sex, for example, but
this fact does not justify the automatic exclusion of women from
consideration. Cohn's model would therefore appear to be severely
limited as a tool for determining the substantiation of a BFOQ
8 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
87 Cohn, supra note 1, at text preceeding n.36.
:3 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977).
89 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 422 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (emphasis. in original),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
:0 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
1 In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146-47
(7th Cir. 1978).
92 Id. at 1147 (emphasis added). See also Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1974);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
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defense.93
Next, Cohn argues that partial correlation analysis would be use-
ful to detect the presence of an explicit sex factor in the hiring
decision process. 9 4 Familiar problems with this analysis arise. Cohn
is proposing that the court control for sex differences in true job
qualifications and thus determine the probability of males and fe-
males being hired once the effect of legitimate differences is ac-
counted for. Again, the model makes the assumption that job-re-
lated qualifications have already been ascertained by the court. As
previously noted, this approach must contemplate a reversal of the
Griggs order of proof.9 5
Further, the subjective component of the hiring process that al-
lows the employer, such as Cohn's hypothetical employer, to select
among candidates who have already passed the other requirements
must be considered a selection procedure in itself.9 8 As such, the
subjective component is capable of being scrutinized for its dispa-
rate impact without reference to the other requirements. A previ-
ous section of Cohn's article made a similar suggestion,9 7 so it is
unclear why the correlation analysis is needed at all. Moreover, the
subjective component that selects some individuals over others
from among an equally qualified group (qualified in the sense that
they have all passed the previous requirements) gives an individual
claim of intentional discrimination to a plaintiff under McDonnell
Douglas v. Green,98 reference to the effect of other requirements is
not needed once it is shown that the individual has met them. In
either type of case, Cohn's analysis is unnecessary at best.
11 Cohn's use of correlation analysis for age as a BFOQ meets with the same substantive
problem. Cohn uses correlation analysis to show the relationship between age and the re-
quirement of his hypothetical employer that applicants be willing to stay on the job for five
years. Cohn, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.36. Cohn's analysis again begins with the
unproven assumption that the requirement is job-related. Id. at text accompanying n.37.
Even if it were, however, Cohn fails to realize that even a perfect correlation such as the one
in his example might easily fail to qualify as a BFOQ. See generally Employee Benefit
Plans; Amendment to Interpretative Bulletin, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979) (to be codified in
29 C.F.R. § 860); Bickerton, The ADRA Comes of Age, 16 TRiAL 23 (1980). The limited kind
of case to which Cohn's analysis might apply would be pilot applicants, where safety can
justify the exclusion. The key factor is the safety component, however, not the perfect corre-
lation. See Murnane v. American Airline, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 284, 293
(D.D.C. 1979). For further clarification of the difference between the business necessity de-
fense and the BFOQ defense, see Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Cohn, supra note 1, at text between nn.37 & 38.
" See notes 84-85 & accompanying text supra.
9' See A. SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 850-57 (1977).
97 Cohn, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.20.
98 411 U.S. 792 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Dr. Richard M. Cohn's article, On the Use of Statistics in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, regrettably does not provide use-
ful methods of probing legally relevant questions. His criticisms of
existing methods, as well as his own proposals, both derive from a
more limited concept of discrimination under Title VII than the
Supreme Court's definition. Intentional discrimination or unequal.
treatment are both prohibited by the Act, but also prohibited is
the use of selection procedures that disproportionately exclude a
group covered by the Act unless the employer can demonstrate the
job-relatedness of the requirements. Cohn's methods do not make
these distinctions in the definition of discrimination, nor do they
take into account the order and allocation of the burden of proof
provided by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany.9 9 Under Griggs the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
showing the adverse impact of the employer's selection procedures,
and then the burden shifts to the defendant to show the job-relat-
edness of the requirements. Cohn's methods assume that the job-
relatedness of the requirements has already been proven before the
analysis of exclusion begins.100
Furthermore, the concept of disproportionate exclusion contem-
plates proof that both actual and potential applicants to the em-
ployer are adversely affected by the requirement. It is the effect of
the selection procedures on this population that is at issue in es-
tablishing the prima facie case.101 Any analysis that is limited to
studying the effect of procedures on one year's applicants alone, as
Cohn suggests, does not address the legally relevant question. Even
if equal proportions of minority and majority applicants one year
happen to have a high school diploma, for example, the use of a
high school diploma requirement can still establish a prima facie
case if the diploma requirement adversely affects potential minor-
ity applicants.102 The same reasoning applies to testing require-
ments because the population in which the court is interested in-
cludes both present and potential applicants.
As Cohn notes, interdisciplinary work is greatly needed in em-
ployment discrimination law, and his work is to be commended as
99 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
100 See notes 55-58 & accompanying text supra.
"o, See notes 18-20 & accompanying text supra.
102 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
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a step in that direction. It is true that lawyers are ill-versed in
quantitative methods and need to understand these tools as well as
any other tools of evidence. It is equally important, however, that
quantitative methods be responsive to the legally relevant ques-
tions. When methods are used that provide answers to different
questions, the proof has effectively altered the issues. If the legally
relevant questions are themselves being challenged as wrongly
phrased, then the challenge should be a direct one and not done
under the guise of improving methods of proof. Legal issues should
be addressed as legal issues; quantitative methods of proof must be
responsive to the legal questions posed. This reply's primary objec-
tion to Cohn's approach to the use of statistics in employment dis-
crimination cases is that his approach is not responsive to the rele-
vant legal questions.
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